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JUSTICE BY ANY OTHER NAME: THE RIGHT TO A JURY
TRIAL AND THE CRIMINAL NATURE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
IN LOUISIANA*
The juvenile justicesystem has become increasinglypunitive in recentdecades.
While thejuvenile justice system has come to resemble the adult system in this way,
juvenilesfacingadjudicationnevertheless are denied the essentialSixth Amendment
due process right. This Note will argue that the LouisianaSupreme Court decided
State ex rel. D.J. incorrectly and,further, will demonstrate that the nation as a
whole should revisit the place ofjuries in juvenile proceedings.

INTRODUCTION

One of society's worst nightmares became reality on September 26, 2000. On
the schoolyard of Carter G. Woodson Middle School in New Orleans, two students
faced death as bullets tore through their bodies, leaving them critically wounded.'
William P. lost his spleen and one kidney as a result of the bullet that entered his
abdomen. Darrell J. remains confined to a wheelchair.2 The incident received
national news3 and, to some, legitimized the recent, significant transformation of
juvenile justice in America - the criminalization of serious juvenile delinquency.
Soon after this incident, Darrell J. and his friend, Alfred A., faced charges of
attempted second-degree murder and carrying a firearm on school property.4
Allegedly, Alfred passed the gun through the schoolyard fence to Darrell.' Darrell
then attacked William P., and the ensuing struggle led to both juveniles' near fatal
injuries.6
As Alfred A. and Darrell J.'s case has proceeded through the Louisiana Juvenile
Justice System, the courts have afforded the defendants many of the due process
rights that adults facing criminal charges enjoy - including the right to counsel, the
right to face their accusers, and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof.
* The author would like to thank Kelly Gastley, Charles Wolf, Zane Wolf, Juli
Vendzules, Professor James Dwyer, and the staff of the William and Mary Bill of Rights
Journalfor their valuable guidance.
1 See State ex rel. D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d 26, 26-28.
2 See id. at 28 n.2.
3 See Katy Reckdahl, Kids in the Hall, GAMBIT WEEKLY, at http://www.bestofnew
orleans.com/archives/2001/0522/covs.html (May 22, 2001) (reporting that most large daily
newspapers in the country covered the incident).
4 D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 27.
5 Id. at 28 n.2.
6

Id.
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Importantly, however, Louisiana denied Alfred's and Darrell's Sixth Amendment
right to demand a jury trial7 - a right possessed by every American over eighteen
years of age facing a criminal charge. This remains the case, despite the reality that
juvenile justice has become increasingly punitive in recent decades, and
consequently, more criminal in nature. Thus, while the juvenile justice system
increasingly resembles the adult system in this way, juveniles facing adjudication
nevertheless are denied this essential Sixth Amendment due process right.
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury ... ."' It is easy to conclude that this provision of the Constitution
does not apply to juvenile proceedings, simply because some courts view such
proceedings as not being equivalent to criminal proceedings. In 1971, the Supreme
Court said as much in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.9 Yet, as our nation's various
juvenile justice systems continue to evolve, the delineation between juvenile and
criminal justice becomes further obscured.
Section 17 of Article 1 of the Louisiana Constitution, while using different
language, also guarantees jury trials to the criminally accused.'" The Louisiana
Supreme Court followed the precedent provided by McKeiver when it decided In
re Dino," holding that the state constitution does not extend this right to include
juvenile delinquency proceedings. Importantly, the prevailing rationale supporting
both of these decisions was that juvenile justice lacked the punitive nature of
criminal justice and, instead, focused on rehabilitation. Subsequent to these
decisions, Louisiana has changed its juvenile justice system, rendering its
proceedings punitive in nature. 2 The question thus becomes, have the changes
made to the Louisiana juvenile justice system since McKeiver and Dino caused
delinquency proceedings to become criminal in nature?
The Juvenile District Court for the Parish of Orleans faced this question when
it presided over the delinquency petitions against Darrell J. and Alfred A.' 3 The
7

Id. at 34.

amend. VI.
9 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
'o LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17. Specifically, Section 17 states that:
[a] criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a
jury ....A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard
labor shall be tried before a jury ....A case in which the punishment may be
confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more than six
months shall be tried before a jury ....
8 U.S. CONST.

Id.
" 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), overruledon other groundsby State v. Fernandez, 96-2719
(La. 04/14/98), 712 So. 2d 485, 490.
12 See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
'" See State ex rel. D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d 26, 28.
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juvenile district courtjudge boldly declared Louisiana's outright denial ofjury trials
in delinquency proceedings unconstitutional, emphasizing the punitive nature of the
state's juvenile justice system.'4 However, on direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed the holding of Dino and refused to acknowledge a juvenile's right
to ajury trial in a delinquency proceeding. 5 This Note will argue that the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided State ex rel. D.J. incorrectly and, further, will demonstrate
that the nation as a whole should revisit the place of juries in juvenile proceedings.
First, this Note will review the history of juvenile justice in America to
establish a complete picture of today' s juvenile justice systems. A brief comparison
of juvenile justice to criminal justice will follow in order to illuminate the
increasingly blurry line between the two systems. Third, by critiquing the Louisiana
Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. D.J., this Note will provide both a detailed
account of the issue in Louisiana, and illustrate the flaws in the court's decision.
Fourth, the controversy over jury trials in delinquency proceedings will be analyzed
in a national context in order to demonstrate the national relevance of State ex rel.
D.J. Finally, by discussing the potential consequences of allowing allegedjuvenile
delinquents to demand jury trials, this Note will illustrate that jury trials should be
a welcomed addition to America's juvenile justice systems. Ultimately, this Note
will assert that Louisiana's recent criminalization of serious' 6 juvenile delinquency
necessitates extension of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to serious
juvenile delinquency proceedings. Additionally, it will demonstrate that this issue
is of significant national concern, as troubled youth continue to bear the brunt of
14

See id.

'5

See id., at 34-35.

Limiting this discussion to serious delinquency proceedings is essential because,
similar to the criminal system when an adult faces a misdemeanor charge carrying a limited
sentence, having a jury would be unreasonable in a proceeding in which ajuvenile is accused
of a minor offense. While there is no one consideration that distinguishes serious delinquency
proceedings from other proceedings, the severity of disposition options and the nature of the
alleged act provide some guidance. For instance, a delinquency proceeding for a petty
shoplifting offense would not qualify as serious because the alleged act was not violent or
particularly troublesome. In contrast, a delinquency proceeding for armed robbery would
qualify as serious because the alleged act is violent in nature, and likely disposition options
include long-term confinement in a juvenile correctional facility. In Louisiana, the state's
delineation between a felony-grade delinquent act and a misdemeanor-grade delinquent act
might serve as an appropriate guideline for defining a serious delinquency proceeding. The
state could reasonably limit a juvenile's right to demand a jury to proceedings in which the
juvenile is accused of a felony-grade delinquent act. See LA. REV. CH. CODE ANN. art. 804
(West 2002) (defining "felony-grade delinquent act" and "misdemeanor-grade delinquent
act"); LA. REV. CH. CODE ANN. art. 897 (West 2002) (explaining the disposition options for
juveniles adjudicated for felony-grade delinquent acts); LA. REv. CH. CODE ANN. art. 897.1
(West 2002) (explaining the disposition options for juveniles adjudicated for other felonygrade delinquent acts).
16
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punitive juvenile justice systems without the Sixth Amendment due process
protection of a trial by jury.
I. THE STORY OF AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE
The history of juvenile justice in America began in the Colonial Period. 7 The
emphasis during this era was on the family, as young lawbreakers were sent home
to receive punishment from their parents.' 8 Only if their parents' discipline proved
ineffective were they returned to public officials, who subjected them to further
punishment, including public whippings, dunking, and time in the stocks.' 9
During the first half of the eighteenth century, a new trend in juvenile justice
emerged - houses of refuge.2" These public institutions seem to be the
predecessors of modem-day juvenile training schools and institutions. Houses of
refuge were strictly-run facilities modeled after Puritan homes, that strove to save
disobedient children from their inadequate parents, from the dangers and influences
of the streets, and from their own weak morals.2 Due to unsanitary and unsafe
conditions, overcrowding, and general ineffectiveness, these houses failed to
survive into the twentieth century.22 Instead, at century's turn, revolutionary
juvenile court systems emerged in response to the demands of juvenile justice
reformers.23
The first juvenile court appeared in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois. 2' Based on
the concept of parens patriae, juvenile courts were expected to "step in and
exercise guardianship over a child found under such adverse social or individual
conditions as to encourage the development of crime."2" The juvenile was to
"receive practically the care, custody, and discipline that are accorded the neglected
and dependent child, and which, as the act states, 'shall approximate as nearly as
may be that which should be given by its parents."' 26 Ideally, the system would
provide flexibility, so that each juvenile would receive the help he or she needed to
become a productive member of society. 27

The juvenile courts affirmatively

1' CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 12 (5th ed. 2000).
Is Id.
19 ld.
20

2
22
23
24

Id.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.

2 Id. (quoting the Chicago Bar Association, which was responsible for forming the first

juvenile court).

Id.
See Robert G. Caldwell, The Juvenile Court: Its Development and Some Problems,in
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A READER 285 (Richard D. Knudten & Stephen Schafer eds., 1970)
26

27

('The resulting tendency has been to picture juvenile delinquency as symptomatic of some
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recognized that children were not solely to blame for their deviance.2" They
considered factors such as poverty, city life, family life, schools, and neighborhoods
when determining the juvenile's fate. 29 Institutionalization of juveniles continued,
however, as the state often determined that the interest of protecting society from
a juvenile's potential actions outweighed the juvenile's needs.30
By the mid-twentieth century, every state had its own juvenile court system. At
the same time, however, criticism of these systems increased, as many believed the
courts were administering inconsistent and arbitrary justice3'

-

proceedings were

often conducted hastily; the police treated juveniles with brutality; and juvenile
institutions remained unsafe.32

Many advocates for juvenile justice reform

suggested that the system was creating more crime, as opposed to preventing it.33
Even more concerning, the informality of juvenile cour proceedings denied
juveniles many of their basic rights.' 4 In response, the Supreme Court heard a series
of cases dealing with juveniles' due process rights in delinquency proceedings."
Most notably, the Court decided In re Gault 6 in 1957 and Pennsylvania v.
McKeiver"7 in 1971.38
In re Gault arose out of a controversy in Arizona involving a number of
juveniles' due process rights.39 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that juveniles

underlying emotional condition, which must be diagnosed by means of the concepts and
techniques of psychiatry, psychology, and social work, and for which treatment, not
punishment, must be administered . .
28 id.
29 BARTOLLAS, supra note 17, at 13.
30 Id. at 14.
31 id.
32 Id.
33 Id.

4 See Caldwell, supra note 27, at 294. Caldwell explained:
[Tlhe rights of the child and his parents are especially endangered if the case is
handled with extreme informality, because then there is no attorney to guard
against the abuse of authority, no set rules to ward off hearsay and gossip, no
way of breaking through the secrecy of the hearing, and often no appeal from the
court's decision.
Id.

35 BARTOLLAS,
36

supra note 17, at 14.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).

3' 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
38 Other Supreme Court

cases concerning the due process rights of juveniles include In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that the standard of proof in delinquency
proceedings is "beyond a reasonable doubt") and Breed v. Jones, 412 U.S. 519 (1975)
(holding that juveniles are entitled to double jeopardy protections).
31 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 4-11.
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have the right to notice of charges," ° to counsel," to confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses," and to the privilege against self-incrimination." In
deciding the case, the Court developed the doctrine of fundamental fairness, which
is to be applied whenever the due process rights of juveniles are considered." In
assessing the state of juvenile justice at the time of the opinion, Justice Fortas,
writing for the majority, commented:
[T]he highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar
system for juveniles ....And in practice ...the results have not been

entirely satisfactory. Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure. The absence of substantive
standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful,
compassionate, individualized treatment. The absence of procedural
rules based upon constitutional principle has not always produced fair,
efficient, and effective procedures. Departures from established
principles of due process have frequently resulted not in enlightened
45
procedure, but in arbitrariness.
Thus, after In re Gault, the Supreme Court established that juvenile courts in
the U.S. were failing in certain capacities, particularly in upholding constitutional
principles, and that courts should assess the due process rights of juveniles in
delinquency proceedings using the doctrine of fundamental fairness. Moreover, In
re Gault placed a duty upon the Court to evaluate juvenile justice procedures with
a focus on juveniles' constitutional rights and the realities of juvenile justice
systems.46

Relying on the framework established by In re Gault, the Supreme Court
decided McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.47 The Court in McKeiver was asked to decide
a due process issue left unanswered by In re Gault - a juvenile's right to a jury
trial in a delinquency proceeding. In holding that fundamental fairness does not
require the right to a jury trial, the Court supplied several reasons. Most notably,
the Court explained that "[tlhere is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if
required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding
40

See id. at 31-34.

"' See id. at 34-42.
42

See id. at 42-57.

41 See id.

4 See id. at 19-21, 30.
45 Id. at 17-19.
46 See id. at 13

(explaining, "[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.").
47 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding."48 The Court also
reasoned that jury trials would not "strengthen greatly, if at all, the factfinding
function, and would, contrarily, provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed
ability to function in a unique manner. It would not remedy the defects of the
system."' 9 Thus, after the Supreme Court affirmed juveniles' due process rights,
excluding the right to a jury trial, juvenile justice systems were restrained in their
ability to administer arbitrary justice.
Despite these extensions ofjuveniles' constitutional rights, problems continued
to persist and new approaches to juvenile justice were considered.5 ° During the
1970s, while the Supreme Court considered juveniles' due process rights,
community-based initiatives began to flourish, as reformers called for these
programs to replace juvenile training schools as the source of corrective influence
in a juvenile delinquent's life." By the late 1970s, states were diverting status
offenses52 from a "criminal" setting into family courts, treating status offenders
similarly to dependent and neglected children. States provided these minors with
social services and generally refrained from compelling institutionalization. 3 At
the same time, the system was somewhat ignoring the more serious juvenile
offenders, and public outcry over violent youth crime became apparent.54
The reformers' emphasis on diverting status offenders away from criminal
sanctions, and seeming neglect of more serious offenders, opened the door for a
new era of juvenile justice ushered in by the Reagan administration.55 As a result
of the Reagan administration's "get tough" attitude towards juvenile delinquency,
five trends emerged during the 1980s: preventative detention, transfer of juveniles
to the adult criminal courts, mandatory sentencing, increased confinement of
juveniles, and enforcement of the death penalty. 6 Sweeping reforms of the juvenile
justice system continued into the 1990s, as the public became more aware of violent
youth crimes.57

48 Id. at
49
50

545.

Id. at 547.
See BARTOLLAS, supra note 17, at 14.

51 Id.
5 Status

offenses include running away from home, truancy, curfew violations, and

underage drinking and smoking. A basic definition of a status offense is a punishable act
committed by a juvenile that would not be punishable if committed by an adult. Id. at 5.
" Id. at 14.
' Id. at 15.
55 Id.
56

Id. at 16.

" Id. at 17 (explaining that these reforms focused on gang activity, hate crimes, gun use,
and involvement with drugs).
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These reforms manifested themselves in several ways, including new curfew
laws,5" parental responsibility laws,59 a focus on combating gang activity,6"
graduated sanctions, 61 boot camps, gun prevention, expanded public access to
juvenile records and proceedings, 61 common transfers to criminal courts, 6 3 and
expanded sentencing authority for juvenile court judges.'
A present-day picture of juvenile justice includes themes from each stage of
juvenile justice development: from emphasis on family responsibility, to
individualized dispositions, tojuvenile executions. For example, ajudge in juvenile
court retains a wide array of disposition options, yet juveniles still face mandatory
sentences and common transfer to adult criminal courts. Furthermore, harsh
juvenile facilities continue to exist in this country,65 despite the increasing
effectiveness of community resources.66
Thus, as ajuvenile's right to a jury trial in a serious delinquency proceeding is
considered, the history and development of juvenile justice in America must be
examined in order to determine the motivations for rapidly changing juvenilejustice
policies and the effectiveness of each policy decision. More importantly, however,
a juvenile's place in all of this change must be carefully considered, as the states
flirt dangerously with serious violations ofjuveniles' most basic rights. Asjuvenile
justice continues to become more punitive, Americans must be ever diligent to
ensure that the rights of their fellow citizens are not denied in an effort to curb
juvenile delinquency.

Numerous states and localities enacted juvenile curfews to curb delinquency.
BARTOLLAS, supra note 17, at 17.
'9 These laws hold parents civilly and criminally liable for their children's delinquent
acts. Id. at 18.
6 This includes both community grassroots efforts and laws that mandate harsher
penalties for gang-related crimes such as drive-by shootings. Id. at 18-19.
6" Harsher punishments are mandated for juveniles with multiple offenses or juveniles
that have the potential to commit an offense. Id. at 19.
62 See, e.g., LA. REV. CH. CODE ANN. art. 407 (West 2002) (allowing a judge to open to
the public delinquency proceedings that involve violent offenses).
58

63 See, e.g., LA. REV. CH. CODE ANN. art. 857 (West 2002) (allowing juveniles over the
age of fourteen who stand accused of certain offenses to be transferred for criminal
prosecution).
64 See BARTOLLAS, supra note 17, at 17.
65 See Robert G. Schwartz, Juvenile Justice and Positive Youth Development, in YOUTH
DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS

256-57 (2000).

' Id. at 261 (listing as examples: the Oregon Social Learning Center that developed an
effective foster-care program, and Kaleidoscope in Chicago, which utilized effective "wrap
around" services).
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II. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE

Following this discussion of the developments in the juvenile justice system,
many important questions emerge. One of these questions is: what do we hope to
accomplish from a juvenile delinquency proceeding? More specifically, what
should be the goal of an adjudicated juvenile delinquent's disposition?
As juvenile court systems came into existence, it was clear that rehabilitation
and treatment were central to dispositions, along with the protection of society.67
During the 1980s and 1990s, however, as violent youth crimes became the source
of outspoken public concern, punishment of juvenile delinquents also became
important. This is evidenced by the trends towards mandatory sentences and
criminal trials for certain delinquent acts.6"
If one compares the goals of sentencing in America's criminal justice system
with the present goals of dispositions in the various state juvenile justice systems,
it becomes clear that the juvenile justice systems of today are very similar to the
modem criminal justice system. Four common goals of the states' criminal justice
systems are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.69

As

discussed above, the latter three goals have been part of juvenile justice since the
beginning of the twentieth century.7" More recently, however, retribution has
become essential in juvenile justice, despite the intentions of those who first
developed the juvenile courts. 7' As a result of this development, tension exists
between retribution and rehabilitation, and between social control and thejuvenile's
welfare.72 In this battle, retribution and social control generally prevail.73
In fact, as status offenders are diverted away from juvenile delinquency

proceedings and the most serious offenders are transferred to criminal court, the
focus ofjuvenile courts becomes directed towards serious delinquent offenders that
have not committed offenses so egregious as to be tried as adults.74 Juvenile courts

67
68

See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text
See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.

61 JOHNM. SCHEB &JOHN M. SCHEB,II, CRIMINALLAW AND PROCEDURE

20-21 (4thed.

2002).
70

See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.

7 See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
72 Schwartz, supra note 65, at 250.
13 See id. (arguing that juvenile justice officials do not possess a comparable level of
concern to an "ordinary devoted parent").
14

See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE

COURT 246 (1999) (describing state policies that segregate juvenile offenders according to
the seriousness of the crime as a "triage" technique).
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can then "get tough" and punish these remaining delinquents."
This point forces a serious consideration of ajuvenile's right to ajury trial. The
McKeiver decision seemed to overlook the fact that delinquency proceedings were
punitive as well as rehabilitative. 76 This is true now more so than in the past, as
developments in the 1980s and 1990s brought new levels of punishment to juvenile
delinquency."
LI. A THOROUGH CONSIDERATION OF STATE EX REL D.J.

Against one dissentingjustice, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State ex rel D.J.
decided to affirm Louisiana's practice of denying juveniles the right to jury trials
in serious delinquency proceedings." A close look at the majority's reasoning in
this case reveals significant logical flaws in their analysis, which leaves their
decision open to critique, and the state's practice vulnerable to well-founded
criticism. First, it is necessary to discuss both the facts of this case and its
procedural history in order to understand the context in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided the case. It then becomes important to consider the Court's
reasoning in the case, evaluating its assertions and conclusions in order to assess the
validity of the majority's opinion.
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
On September 26, 2000, a shooting occurred on the schoolyard of Carter G.
Woodson Middle School in New Orleans. According to court records, a fifteenyear-old student, Alfred A., passed a handgun through the schoolyard's fence to a
thirteen-year-old student, Darrell J. 79 After Darrell J. discharged the handgun,
another student, William P., obtained the gun and also fired the weapon. William
P. lost his kidney and his spleen due to a gun shot wound, and Darrell J. was
partially paralyzed and remains wheelchair-bound. Alfred A. was not injured in the
incident.
" Id. (stating that the Supreme Court based its decision to deny juveniles the right to a
jury trial on the differences between juvenile treatment and punishment).
76 See id. at 247.
77 See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
78 State ex rel.D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d 26, 34-35 ("While we
recognize that the Louisiana juvenile is far from perfect, we are not ready to spell the doom
of the juvenile court system by requiring juvenile trials in juvenile adjudications.") (citing
In re C.B., 97-2783 (La. 03/11/98), 708 So. 2d 391, 398).
79 In typical delinquency proceedings, the initials of any minor discussed in the case are
recorded in place of his or her full name in order to protect their anonymity. Due to the media
coverage of Darrell J. and Alfred A.'s public trial, their names are known to those outside the

courtroom.
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On October 24, 2000, Alfred A. and Darrell J. were charged with attempted
second-degree murder and carrying a firearm on school property." On November
30, 2000, Darrell J., joined by Alfred A., filed a motion for a jury trial before the
Juvenile District Court for the Parish of Orleans."1 After considering supporting
memorandums and conducting several hearings, the court decided that thejuveniles
were entitled to a jury trial.8" The Juvenile District Court based its decision on
recent changes in the state's juvenile justice system that caused delinquency
proceedings to become criminal in nature.8 3 The court also offered a supplemental
ruling that declared unconstitutional Article 808 of the Louisiana Children's Code. 4
Following these rulings, the state filed a direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme
Court. The state supreme court reversed the Juvenile District Court's ruling and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 5
B. Scrutinizing the Majority Opinion

The majority opinion, penned by Justice Victory, presented its argument by: (1)
addressing the Juvenile District Court's opinion; (2) providing a cursory picture of
the history of the juvenile justice system, including a discussion of the right to a
jury trial; (3) discussing relevant precedent; (4) assessing the role of the judge in
juvenile proceedings; (5) comparing certain aspects of Louisiana's criminal justice
system with its juvenile justice system; and (6) looking at other states' juvenile
justice laws and their approaches to the issue. 6 A careful look at several of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's arguments uncovers significant flaws in the court's
analysis.
The Louisiana Supreme Court first focused on a mistake committed by the
Juvenile District Court for the Parish of Orleans. 7 The court pointed out that while
the lower court properly recognized that Article 808 of the Louisiana Children's
Code does not expressly prohibit jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 8
80

See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:27 (West 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

14:30.1 (West

2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (West 2002).
81 D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 28.

id.
See id. (stating that the trial court relied on Article 808 of the Children's Code, which
granted juveniles all the rights afforded criminal defendants, exceptjury trials, as an enabling
82

13

statute, and not a due process violation).

u Id. Article 808 guarantees juveniles facing court proceedings all rights guaranteed to
criminal defendants, except the right to a jury trial. LA. REv. CH. CODE ANN. art. 808 (West
2002).
85 D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 34-35.
87

id.
Id. at 28-29.

88

LA. REv. CHi. CODE ANN. art. 808 (West 2002).

86
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it overlooked Article 882, which explicitly states thatjuvenile adjudication hearings
must be held without a jury. 9 This is primarily a technical mistake and does not
change the analysis on either side of the argument. However, it is important to
understand that not only are juveniles facing delinquency proceedings denied the
right to demand a jury trial, they may not even make a request for a jury trial, even
if the court believes that a jury trial is necessary to guarantee a fair proceeding.
This point made the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision critical, as their finding,
that the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings is not constitutionally
guaranteed, ensured that juveniles cannot have their cases heard before a jury.9"
The majority devoted a portion of their opinion to a review of the history of
juvenile justice in America.91 One major consideration emerges from the court's
discussion: Louisiana's juvenile justice system was founded upon the same
philosophy as all of the other juvenile justice systems in the United States.92 This
philosophy focused on nurturing and rehabilitating youth.93 This point was
important to the court because it laid the groundwork for the assertion that juvenile
adjudication proceedings should be decided by a judge. However, as will be
demonstrated below, this philosophy has been lost in Louisiana, as state laws have
become focused more on retribution than rehabilitation.
The court then proceeded to discuss U.S. Supreme Court decisions and
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions that have affected the right to a jury trial in
serious delinquency proceedings. 94 First, the majority mentioned In re Gault, a
1967 Supreme Court case that established the "fundamental fairness" doctrine. 95
Also mentioned are decisions rendered by the Louisiana Supreme Court that relied
on this doctrine.96 The court then discussed McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,97 the
Supreme Court decision that denied a juvenile's right to a jury trial.9" Finally, the
court relied upon its previous holding in In re Dino,99 a decision that, in following
ANN. art. 882 (West 2002).
0 Unless, of course, their decision is overruled by a future court.
91D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 29.
92 id.
9'See LA. REv. CH. CODE ANN. art. 801 (West 2002) (explaining the goal of Louisiana's
juvenile justice system).
4 See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 29-30.
9'See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (affirming a juvenile's right to notice of charges,
to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to privilege against selfincrimination in delinquency proceedings).
96 D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 29-30 (citing In re Banks, 402 So.2d
690 (La. 1978) (granting juveniles the right to preadjudication bail) and In re Causey, 363
So. 2d 472 (La. 1978) (allowing the defense of insanity to be raised in delinquency
proceedings)).
97 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
98 See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d
at 30.
" 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
89 LA. REv. CH. CODE
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McKeiver, also denied juveniles the right to jury trials."0 These cases demonstrate
that the court would have to disregard the precedent set by Dino, overrule its past
holding, and ignore the authority of McKeiver, a case that has stood for more than
thirty years, if it were to declare that a juvenile's right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings is constitutionally guaranteed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court placed undue emphasis and reliance on McKeiver
and Dino. While following precedent is an essential aspect of judicial decision
making, it should not be relied upon when the precedent is no longer valid.'' It is
important to note that the Louisiana Supreme Court relied heavily on McKeiver
when it decided Dino."°2 Thus, in order to demonstrate the diminishing relevance
of both cases, only the McKeiver decision must be analyzed.
Both the amicus brief0 3 and Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion" emphasized
two pitfalls in relying on McKeiver as binding precedent. First, the decision rests
on a plurality opinion that resulted in an indefinite holding. Second, an important
basis for the decision was the distinction between juvenile delinquency proceedings
and criminal proceedings. Because this distinction no longer exists in many
jurisdictions, the Supreme Court's reasoning in McKeiver is no longer relevant.
Justice Blackmun penned the McKeiver decision, and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and Stewart. Justice Blackmun emphasized that
because juvenile delinquency proceedings are premised on "[ ] fairness, [ ]concern,
[ ] sympathy, and [] paternal attention,"'" and because jury trials would cause
delay, formality, adversity, and loss of confidentiality, jury trials are not
constitutionally guaranteed in delinquency proceedings." 6 This point of view,
however, was not supported by the majority of the Court and should not be relied
upon as definitive.° 7 As the amici emphasized, "While Justice Blackmun's opinion
in McKeiver has generally been cited as the opinion of the Court, the plurality
opinions actually share no common rationale."' ° The amici further argued that the
Supreme Court has explained "the holding of the plurality opinion is the narrowest
100 See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 30.
"' See Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al. at 9, 12-13, State ex rel. D.J.,
2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d 26 (No. 2001-KA-2149) [hereinafter Brief].
102 See Dino, 359 So. 2d at 598. The court specifically noted that:
For reasons similar to those expressed in McKeiver, a majority of this Court has
concluded that the Louisiana due process guaranty... does not afford a juvenile
the right to a jury trial during the adjudication of a charge of delinquency based
upon acts that would constitute a crime if engaged in by an adult.
Id.
103 Brief, supra note 101.
'0'See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 35-40 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
105McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
16 See id. at 545, 550.
107 See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 35 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
108 Brief, supra note 101, at 12.
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grounds as to which an agreement among fivejustices can be inferred."' 9 Thus, the
mere fact that Justice Blackmun's opinion in McKeiver is a plurality opinion calls
into question the Louisiana Supreme Court's reliance on McKeiver.
The amici and Justice Johnson argued that the distinction between criminal
proceedings and Louisiana's juvenile justice system is no longer significant enough
to support adherence to the Supreme Court's holding in McKeiver."0 As Justice
Blackmun pointed out, it is undisputed that "fundamental fairness" must be
considered when determining if jury trials should be afforded to juveniles facing
delinquency proceedings."' Thus, when a court considers this question, it must
always return to this basic standard. While at the time of the McKeiver decision,
fundamental fairness may have warranted the denial of the right to a jury trial, the
nature of juvenile justice is different today, particularly in Louisiana." 2 The
juvenile justice system's rapid change during the more than thirty years since
McKeiver seriously undermined any reliance on that decision, as the Court rendered
its decision after considering a very different concept of juvenile justice.",3 Also
consider that three justices dissented in McKeiver, holding that juveniles have the
right to a jury trial, "4 and two concurring justices suggested that they would grant
jury trials when delinquency proceedings became too criminal in nature." 5 Thus,
McKeiver, although binding authority, is seriously compromised because it has
become outdated, and because it was decided by a Court with varying perspectives
on an issue that failed to produce a majority opinion." 6
Indeed, McKeiver itself also stood upon a questionable premise. The Supreme
Court failed to recognize that despite the rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice
systems, in reality, juveniles were being punished."7 The Supreme Court
continually referenced the goal of rehabilitation, but this goal was no longer a
Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
See id. at 13-15; see also D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 35-40
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
9
"

"'

McKeiver, 493 U.S. at 544.

Brief, supranote 101, at 14 ("Louisiana has incorporated principles ofpunishment and
accountability into its juvenile justice system-the two basic hallmarks of the adult criminal
justice system. Where the McKeiver Court assumed the justice system mandated only
rehabilitation and treatment for its young offenders."); see also D.J., 2001-2149 (La.
05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 36-37 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
113 Consider the changes discussed above. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying
text.
"4
See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 35 (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(referring to Justice Douglas's dissent, which was joined by Justice Black and Justice
Marshall).
"' See id. (Johnson, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice White's and Justice Harlan's
concurring opinions).
116 Brief, supra note 101, at 12 (discounting the persuasiveness of a plurality opinion).
17 See FELD, supranote 74, at 246 (asserting that the punitive
nature of involuntary loss
of personal liberty eluded the Court in McKeiver).
"'
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reality." Thus, if the Court hoped to prevent punitive dispositions in juvenile
courts, it did not do so by denying jury trials - punishment was already a reality.
Considering again the changes that have occurred since McKeiver, it becomes even
clearer that whatever ideal may have existed as states developed their juvenile
justice systems had been eroded by the time of McKeiver,and continued to diminish
since that landmark case.
In addition to McKeiver and Dino, the Louisiana Supreme Court also relied on
In re C.B. to support its decision. "9 In that case, the court declared unconstitutional
a law that allowed delinquent juveniles to be sent to adult penitentiaries when they
turned seventeen. 2 The court applied that reasoning to the present case by
inferring that, because it chose to declare that law unconstitutional, it was also
making the decision that juveniles should not be granted the right to ajury trial.' 2 '
According to the majority:
This holding is significant, because it infers that the Court determined
that the other statutes that "blurred the distinction" between adult and
juvenile proceedings, such as the public hearing and the sentence
enhancement statutes, did not offend due process requirements to such
an extent that a jury trial would be required.'22
This is a substantial inference for the court to make. The issue of trial by jury
was not before the court when it decided In re C.B.; they only needed to decide the
constitutionality of the law that transferred juveniles to adult prisons.' 23 To assume
that the authority to deny a juvenile's right to demand a jury trial stems from this
decision is an inappropriate inferential leap. The Louisiana Supreme Court should
not conclude from its earlier silence concerning the issue of jury trials that it
affirmatively asserted that juveniles should not have the right to a jury trial.
Moreover, In re C.B. contains language which suggests that the court believed the
juvenile justice system in Louisiana was becoming increasingly criminal in
nature.'24 If there is any consideration that should be extracted from In re C.B., it
Id.
See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 32.
20 In re C.B., 97-2783 (La. 03/11/98), 708 So. 2d 391.
121 See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 32.
122 Id. at 33.
23 See C.B., 97-2783 (La. 03/11/98), 708 So. 2d at 394-95 (listing the issues appealed
to the Louisiana Supreme Court).
214See id. at 396 (explaining that "[t]he changing nature of juvenile crime, however, has
engendered changes in the nature of the juvenile delinquency adjudication which have
blurred the distinction between juvenile and adult procedures," and as a result, "the once
heralded distinctions between juvenile and adult proceedings in this state are fast
diminishing.").
118
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is that Louisiana's juvenile justice system was teetering on the line between
juvenile and criminal at the time the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the case.
The supreme court next anticipated how juries would affect the judge's role in
juvenile delinquency proceedings, asserting that jury trials would "destroy the
flexibility of the juvenile judge as the trier of fact, which allows the judge to take
into consideration social and psychological factors, family background, and
education in order to shape the disposition in the best interest of both the child and
society."' ' This belief is faulty on two grounds. First, why would Louisiana's
juvenile justice system want a trier of fact to be flexible? Determining whether a
juvenile committed a delinquent act should result in a simple yes or no answer.
With only two answers available to the trier of fact in an adjudication proceeding,
there is no place for flexibility.
The flexibility should come into play during the disposition, which leads to the
second shortcoming in the court's assertion. The fact that a jury is the trier of fact
during an adjudication proceeding would have minimal effect on the judge's
flexibility during the disposition. The disposition is the proceeding in which a
juvenile court judge should consider "social and psychological factors, family
background, and education" in order to craft an appropriate and effective
disposition. 2 6 These considerations should help the judge determine how best to
rehabilitate the juvenile delinquent. They should not determine whether or not a
juvenile should be adjudicated delinquent. 27 Therefore, the court's reasoning on
this matter was erroneous.
The Louisiana Supreme Court next discussed the great disparity between the
sentence facing a juvenile delinquent adjudicated for attempted second-degree
murder and carrying a firearm on school property versus the sentence facing an
adult who commits the same offenses. 2 Admittedly, the disparity is significant.
However, even though juvenile dispositions may be considered less punitive than
adult sentences, such dispositions may still stray from the goal of rehabilitation. As
Justice Johnson made clear in his dissent, an eight-year term at one of Louisiana's
juvenile prisons is a punitive sentence.'29 Therefore, the difference between the
sentences for adult and juvenile offenders is insignificant in determining whether
dispositions are punitive.
125

D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 33.

This language is borrowed from the text accompanying note 125, which is extracted
from the majority opinion in D.J.
127 Id. at 39 (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("The judge would still be free to take into
consideration social and psychological factors, family background, and education in order
to shape the disposition in the best interest of both the child and society.").
128 See id. The difference being a maximum eight-year sentence for the juvenile as
compared with fifty-five years for the adult.
129 Id. at 37 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (pointing to several stories printed by the New York
Times that reported on the horrifying conditions at Louisiana's juvenile prisons).
126
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Furthermore, adults charged with offenses punishable by six months or more
in prison are afforded the right to a jury trial in Louisiana.130 Thus, even if the
sentencing options for adults were equivalent to the disposition options ofj uveniles
(a maximum of eight years in this case), adult offenders would still have the right
to a jury.
In completing its argument against affording juveniles the right to a jury trial,
the court compared Louisiana's juvenile justice system to the systems of other
states.' 3' Specifically, it focused on statutes that allow juveniles under the age of
fourteen to be imprisoned beyond their twenty-first birthdays if they have been
adjudicated delinquent.'
Louisiana law ensures that a juvenile that has been
adjudicated delinquent for an offense committed before his or her fourteenth
birthday will not be imprisoned beyond age twenty-one.'
The court likely
highlights this comparison to demonstrate that, unlike other states, Louisiana has
not taken certain steps to criminalize juvenile delinquency. This point should not
affect the outcome of the case. While Louisiana does not have this particular law,
it does have other laws that criminalize juvenile delinquency.'3 4 Thus, the presence
or absence of this law is not a dispositive factor in the assessment of Louisiana's
juvenile justice system.
In order to support its reasoning and decision in this case, the Louisiana
Supreme Court cited several decisions from other jurisdictions. 3 ' The decisions
have refuted challenges to McKeiver's reasoning,'36 have refused to recognize the
right to a jury trial based on the state constitution, 137 have maintained McKeiver's
applicability despite changes in the juvenile justice system,'38 and have rejected
claims that equal protection requires that juveniles have the right to jury trials.'3 9

It is important to note that the court was not citing binding authority, as opinions
rendered by other states' courts are, at best, persuasive. Additionally, none of the
cases cited by the court expressly consider the Louisiana juvenile justice system.
Just as in any other state, it is a unique system that should be individually
See id. at 39 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
33.
33.
133 Id.
1' For example, the two laws highlighted in this opinion. See id. at 31 (discussing LA.
130

13' See id. at
131 See id. at

REv. CH. CODE ANN. art. 407(A) (West 2002) (allowing delinquency proceedings to be open

to the public if they concern an act of violence or a subsequent adjudication) and LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West 2002) (mandating sentencing for habitual offenders)).
131 See id. at 34.
136 Id. (citing United States v. C.L.O, 77 F.3d 1075 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1027 (1996)).
"' Id. (citing State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 856 (1992)).
138 Id. (citing In re Myresheia W., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65 (1998)).
139 Id. (citing People In re T.M., 742 P.2d 905 (Colo. 1987)).
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considered by the Louisiana courts. Because the Louisiana juvenile justice system
is peculiar to Louisiana, it should be treated as such by its state courts.
Accordingly, the national trend that upholds McKeiver and its progeny is minimally
important.
C. What the Louisiana Supreme Court Failedto Discuss
Beyond what the court offered as its reasoning for its decision, it is also
important to consider what the court failed to discuss in its opinion. While the court
mentioned the two laws that the juveniles, the amici, and the dissent suggested
blurred the line between juvenile and criminal proceedings, it did not adequately
address the effects of these laws. 40 The majority also failed to refute specifically
the argument made by Justice Johnson in dissent that these laws make the Louisiana
juvenile justice system so similar to the criminal justice system that the reasoning
of McKeiver no longer applies in Louisiana.' 4 ' Justice Johnson pointed out that the
Louisiana law, which opened alljuvenile delinquency proceedings involving crimes
of violence to the public, destroys the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings.' 42
Confidentiality has been considered an essential aspect of juvenile justice.'43
Justice Johnson cited three articles published in Louisiana, which discuss the story
of Darrell J. and Alfred A., recounting the events of the schoolyard shooting and
revealing the two youths' full names, thereby demonstrating that this law clearly
affects juvenile proceedings." Therefore, the publicity directed towards these
proceedings was no different than the publicity that would be directed towards a
high-profile criminal trial. This certainly does not evoke images of the intimate
settings foreseen by the creators of the modem juvenile justice systems.
Justice Johnson also discussed Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, which
allows juvenile adjudications for drug offenses or violent crimes to be considered
in subsequent proceedings concerning adult felony offenses. 45 Darrell J.'s and
Alfred A.' s potential adjudication for their involvement in the schoolyard shooting
could be used to enhance any adult felony charges that they might face in the

" See State ex rel. D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 31.
generally id.at 817 So.2d at 36-39 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 36 (referring to LA. REV. CH. CODE ANN. art. 407(A) (West 2002)).
141 See

141 See id.
'" See id. (citing to Natalie Pompilio, Two Teenagers Shoot Each Other at School; 13year-old hits rival, 15, who Grabs Gun, Fires,TIMES PICAYUNE, Sept. 27, 2000, at A 1; Bob
Ussery, Suspect in Shooting Released from Hospital; Woodson Student Faces Friday
Hearing,TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 12, 2000, at B3); see also Katy Reckdahl, Kids in the Hall,
(May
GAMBIT WEEKLY, at http://www.bestofneworleans.com/archives/2001/0522/covs.htm
22, 2001).
141 See D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 36-37.
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future.146 In addition to the press coverage of their adjudication, the significant
effect that these laws have on a juvenile's experience is evident.
After mentioning mandatory maximum sentencing laws and the harsh reality of
the Louisiana training institutes (youth detention centers), 47 Justice Johnson
concluded that "[gliven the incorporation of principles of punishment and
accountability into the juvenile system, the adjudications have become more
criminal than civil in nature."'4 This thorough consideration of the laws that sit at
the heart of this controversy was not matched by the majority. Their discussion
instead avoided mentioning the reality of these laws' effects, focusing instead on
the considerations mentioned above. "
D. Conclusions about State ex rel. D.J.

The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. D.J.contained several
flaws that rendered the court's logic invalid. The court made arguments that were
irrelevant to the decision at hand, relied on outdated precedent, misinterpreted
binding precedent, and ignored the realities of Louisiana's juvenile justice system.
As a result, the court denied juveniles in its state the right to jury trials, a right that
should be constitutionally guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment.
1V. BEYOND LOUISIANA: JURY TRIALS IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS ACROSS
AMERICA

It is important to look beyond Louisiana when considering jury trials in

delinquency proceedings in order to illustrate the current state of this nationwide
controversy. An investigation into other states' experiences with this issue reveals
that some states grant juveniles the right to demand jury trials. 50 It also
demonstrates that the current controversy in Louisiana is not the sole instance of

146

See id. at 39.

"'

It is also interesting to note that Louisiana incarcerates juveniles at a higher rate than

any other state. JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., THE A.B.A., CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS

INLOUISIANA 2 (Gabriella Celeste & Patricia Puritz eds., 2001) [hereinafter CHILDREN LEFT
BEHIND].

D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d at 32 at 38 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Others have highlighted the Louisiana training institutes as particularly harsh. See Schwartz,
supra note 65, at 256-57; CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND, supra note 147, at 8 (explaining that
Louisiana training institutes often lack proper rehabilitative services and receive frequent
complaints about abuse).
14"See supra notes 91-139 and accompanying text.
148

'5oSee infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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debate over jury trials in delinquency proceedings in the United States. 5'
A. Some States Allow Juries in Delinquency Proceedings
Less than twenty states grant juveniles the right to jury trials. 5 2 Some states
grant this right in order to protect a juvenile from the potential prejudice of a judge,
while others simply believe that the right to a jury trial is of fundamental
importance. 53 In fact, many states have even codified this right. 54 This is
important, not because the laws of other states should be a controlling influence on
Louisiana, but because these states demonstrate that jury trials can be part of
delinquency proceedings and, furthermore, have not destroyed any state juvenile
system's ability to operate.
B. Some States Struggle With the Same Issues as Louisiana
Beyond this brief mention of states that have granted juveniles the right to jury
trials, it is important to consider other states that have recently grappled with the
issue. In the past decade, scholars have considered certain states' recently enacted
laws that, like the two Louisiana laws highlighted in State ex rel. D.J., enhance the
punitive aspect of the states' juvenile justice systems. It is valuable to consider
scholars' thoughts on these legislative developments and how they might affect a
juvenile's right to a jury trial. This review will help place Louisiana's situation in
a modem, national context, demonstrating both that Louisiana's situation is not
unique and that a serious look at this issue is necessary at this juncture in the
evolution of the American juvenile justice system.
California passed Proposition 184 in 1995, popularly referred to as a "threestrikes-and-you're-out" law.'55 It requires a sentence of twenty-five years to life
imprisonment if a defendant has two prior felony convictions.' 56 David C. Owen
looked at how this law affects California's juvenile justice system.'57 Under the
new law, juvenile delinquency adjudications count towards the three strikes if they

'
152

See infra notes 155-82.
Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and Juvenile Justicefor All: Extending the Right to a

Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 835, 856 (1994).

IId. at 857.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN.
(Michie 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN.
'5

§ 32A-2-16 (Michie 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223
§ 38-1656 (2000); ARK. CODE. ANN § 9-27-505 (Michie

1995).
'55 CAL. PENAL CODE §
156

Id.

1170.12 (West Supp. 1995).

"' See David C. Owen, Comment, Striking Out Juveniles:A Reexamination of the Right

to a Jury Trial in Light of California's"Three Strikes" Legislation, 29 U.C. DAvIs L. REv.
437 (1996).
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concern violent acts.' 58 Therefore, similar to the law in Louisiana, juvenile
delinquency adjudications in California have serious future effects on juveniles'
adult lives. Owen presented the following hypothetical situation in order to
demonstrate the severe implications of this law on the juvenile justice system:
John J. Delinquent is a nineteen-year-old man residing in the state of
California. When John J. was thirteen, a California juvenile court
sentenced him to six months in a California Youth Authority detention
center for burglarizing a neighbor's house. A year later, he received a
one year sentence for forcefully taking a fellow student's lunch money.
John J. did not receive jury trials in those juvenile proceedings because,
under California law, he did not have the right to a jury trial.
Currently, John J. Delinquent is serving twenty-five years to life in a
California state prison for robbing a slice of pizza from a child. Under
California's "three strikes" law, Proposition 184, the trial court used
John J.'s two prior juvenile adjudications to enhance his sentence to a
minimum of twenty-five years.' 9
Despite the fact that John J. was a juvenile when he was adjudicated for the first
two offenses and was not afforded the right to a jury trial, these two offenses
counted towards his three strikes.160 Even though this is a hypothetical, the fact that
John J. faces twenty-five years in prison for burglarizing a neighbor's house,
robbing a peer, and stealing a slice of pizza would (hopefully) seem extreme to
most. The fact that his convictions for two of these offenses occurred without the
option of a jury trial should offend the American sense of justice. 6 '

Owen argued that Proposition 184 fundamentally altered juvenile court
proceedings in California.' 62 He summarized his discussion by commenting,
"Today, California defines juvenile adjudications as felony convictions for the
purpose of sentence enhancement ....Proposition 184... has created extremely
harsh punitive consequences of juvenile adjudications for serious juvenile
offenders. In addition, the purpose and processes of juvenile proceedings now
reflect the punitive nature of the adult criminal justice system." 163 With this in
mind, Owen concluded that serious juvenile offenders should have the right to jury
118

See CAL. PENALCODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1995).

"' Owen, supra note 157, at 437 (footnotes omitted).
'60 Id. at 438.
'.' As Owen pointed out, this story is not a far stretch from the truth. A widely publicized
story out of California demonstrated that a man could face twenty-five years in prison for
stealing a slice of pizza. Id. at 437 n.5 (citing 25 Yearsfor a Slice of Pizza, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1995, S1 at 21).
162 Id. at 464.
163 id.
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trials.' 64
The District of Columbia's decision to deny juveniles the right to demand ajury
trial in delinquency proceedings recently came into question after a class-action suit
condemned the District's juvenilejustice system. 65 The class-action suit criticized
the nonrehabilitative nature of the system, accusing juvenile treatment facilities of
failing to provide adequate care, rehabilitation, and treatment. 166 Although this case
ended in a settlement, Judge Ricardo Urbina issued a consent decree, which was
binding upon the District, that mandated a panel be formed to create a plan for
improving conditions in the District's juvenile facilities.1 67 Despite the1 68consent
decree, facilities remained inadequate, as the District refused to comply.
Susan E. Brooks highlighted this class action in her discussion of a juvenile's
right to a jury trial in the nation's capital.'69 The lack of rehabilitation in the
treatment facilities supported her view that it is past time for jury trials in
delinquency proceedings. 7 ° The ills of the treatment facilities include
overcrowding, lack of continuum of care, physical abuse of the youth, poor
17 1
education services, excessive lockdowns, and insufficient medical services.
These deficiencies prove that the District's juvenile justice system is not
rehabilitative.'72 She concludes her comments on the issue by explaining:
Despite well-meaning intentions, the juvenile court system is not exactly
a safe haven for wayward youth. In fact, conditions for juveniles facing
delinquency proceedings are hostile in the courtroom and beyond... [i]t
is necessary to implement juvenile jury trials to ensure that only those
into the overcrowded facilities
juveniles who truly need help are put
1 73
which purport to provide such help.
Thus, Brooks proposes yet another argument forjury trials injuvenile proceedings:
juries will ensure that only those juveniles who have truly committed delinquent
offenses will be adjudicated, enabling juvenile justice systems to focus their limited
164

Id.

165 See Susan E. Brooks, Juvenile Injustice: The Ban on Jury Trials in the Districtof

Columbia, 33 U. LOuIsVILLE J. FAM. L. 875, 902 (1995) (referencing Jerry M. v. District of

Columbia, No. 1519-85 (D.C. filed 1985)).
166
167
168
169

Id.
Id.
Id. at 903.
See id. at 902-04.

See id.
'' Id. at 903 (citing Michael K. Lewis, Twenty-Third Report of the Monitor (Feb. 16,
1993)).
172 id.
173 Id. at 908.
170
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resources on those who might best benefit from their rehabilitative efforts.
Jury trials in delinquency proceedings also caused controversy in Wisconsin in
1996, when the state significantly changed its Juvenile Justice Code.'74 These
changes included the separation of juvenile delinquents from "children in need of
supervision" in the code sections,"' the lowering of both the minimum age that a
youth can be adjudicated delinquent from twelve to ten-years-old and the maximum
age from eighteen to seventeen-years-old, and most importantly, the elimination of
jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings.176 Thus, Wisconsin's juvenile
justice system presented a unique look at the issue of jury trials, as they had been
part of the state's juvenile justice tradition.
Soon after Wisconsin's new Juvenile Justice Code took effect, a case was
brought before the state's supreme court that challenged the Code's
constitutionality.'77 In a 4-3 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
Juvenile Justice Code did not create a juvenile justice system that was criminal in
nature and, therefore, jury trials were not constitutionally guaranteed.' 78 The court
pointed to the Code's balanced approach, which considered rehabilitation,
accountability, and community protection.'79
Jaime L. Preciado argued that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in overlooking
several features of the new Juvenile Justice Code, erroneously declared the
Wisconsin legislature's decision toremove jury trials from delinquency proceedings
constitutional." 0 Wisconsin serves as a valuable example of the wide array of
juvenile justice systems in America. Despite Wisconsin's tradition of jury trials in
delinquency proceedings, and apparent precedent that recognizes the right to jury
trials in delinquency proceedings, 8 l the court recently denied juveniles this due
process protection."'
These brief discussions of recent controversies over jury trials in delinquency
proceedings demonstrate the national scope of this issue. While a minority of states
have resolved this issue by granting juveniles the right to a jury trial, a broad,
national overview seems to highlight the tensions among the tradition of denying
" See Jaime L. Preciado, Comment, The Right to a Jury Trial in Wisconsin: Rebalancing

the BalancedApproach, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 571, 586-87 (1999).
175 The laws created a new Juvenile Justice Code that focused on juvenile delinquency,
but laws concerning children in need of supervision remained in the Children's Code. See
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.01 (West 2000).
116 Preciado, supra note 174, at 586-87.
177 See id. at 571 nn.4-6 (citing In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998); In re Luis H.,
580 N.W.2d 660 (1998); In re Ryan D.L., 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998)).
178 Id. at 573.
179 Id. at 574.
181

See id. at 571-606.
Id. at 587-90.
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Id. at 572-73 (citing In re Hezzie R., 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998)).
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juveniles this right, McKeiver's uncertain holding, and increasingly punitive
juvenile justice reforms. If the Louisiana Supreme Court (or California or
Wisconsin) became the first court to grant juveniles the right to jury trials, it would
have national implications. An affirmative recognition by one state that its juvenile
justice system has become so criminal in nature that jury trials are a constitutional
necessity would have the potential to start a new national trend. Perhaps, this trend
might finally give significant meaning to Justice Fortas's majority opinion in In re
Gault.183
Unfortunately, with the State ex rel. D.J. decision by the Louisiana Supreme
Court, the ideal moment to give significance to Justice Fortas's sentiments"' may
have passed. Just as in California, Louisiana considers juvenile delinquency
adjudications when determining minimum sentencing guidelines. 8 ' Like the
District of Columbia, Louisiana has a notoriously inadequatejuvenilejustice system
known for the harsh existence it bestows upon the juveniles that are subjected to its
"rehabilitative" efforts. 8 6 Moreover, as previously discussed, Louisiana opens
certain delinquency proceedings to the public. 87 So, if there ever was a place and
time for a state to be the first state in recent years to find it necessary to allow
juveniles facing serious delinquency charges to demand jury trials, that place and
time was Louisiana in 2002. Hopefully, another state soon will question the
reasonableness of its determination to deny juveniles facing serious delinquency
proceedings the right to jury trials.
V. EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF JURIES ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

There are arguments on both sides of this issue that highlight the potential
effects of jury trials on juvenile proceedings. Opponents argue that jury trials
88
would be too burdensome on an already overburdened juvenile court docket.
They also argue that the role of the judge would be so diminished that his or her
ability to shape a delinquency proceeding to meet a juvenile's best interest would
be severely hampered. 89 Opponents further suggest that jury trials would destroy
all remnants of the nurturing ideal to which the juvenile courts have traditionally
aspired. 9 '

183

See supra text accompanying note 45.
id.

'84 See

185 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (West 2002).
186

See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
CH. CODE ANN. art. 407(A) (West 2002); see also Brief, supra note 101,

187 See LA. REV.

at 14.
188

See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.

"89See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.

'90 See infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.

2003]

JUSTICE BY ANY OTHER NAME

Proponents of juries in juvenile delinquency proceedings argue that juries
would grant more consideration to the defenses and claims raised by juveniles
facing delinquency adjudication.' 9' Juries would also take the adjudication
decision-making power out ofjudges' hands, who tend to declare youth delinquent,
despite inadequate proof. 9 2 In addition, proponents demonstrate that many of the
nurturing aspects of the juvenile courts can remain despite the presence of jury
trials.' 93
Arguments on both side of the debate must be thoroughly considered before one
can decide whether juries would be beneficial or detrimental to juvenile
delinquency proceedings. This evaluation will reveal that, although opponents of
jury trials in delinquency proceedings advance valid policy arguments, the
arguments advanced by jury trial proponents establish that juvenile justice will be
a more equitable and effective institution if juveniles are awarded the right to jury
trials in serious delinquency proceedings.
A. Negative Effects of Juries on the Juvenile Justice System
Opponents ofjury trials in delinquency proceedings argue thatjury trials burden
an already overwhelmed juvenile justice system.'94 Jury trials, by their very nature,
would consume more time and drain more resources from a state's juvenile justice
system.' 95 This possibility threatens to completely overwhelm juvenile courts, as
they already face overloaded dockets.
Several well-documented sources suggest thatjuvenile courts are overworked,
causing them to spend an inadequate amount of time with each juvenile brought
before them.' 96 In many cities, less than ten minutes is spent on each juvenile's
adjudication.' 97 For example, in 1996, a study determined that Chicago's juvenile
courts see over sixty cases a day and spend an average of six minutes on each
case.' 98 In New York City, family court judges, who are responsible for
delinquency proceedings, each heard approximately 5,500 cases in one year.199 Los
See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
...See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
13 See infra p. 306.
194 See Larsen, supra note 152, at 866 (referring to opinions held by the Alabama, North
Dakota and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts).
''

195 Id.

196

See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE,

POLICY AND PRACTICE 1044 (2000).
19'Id. (citing Jerome J. Shestack, What About Juvenile Justice?, A.B.A. J. 8 (1998)).
198 Id. (citing Fox Butterfield, With Juvenile Courts in Chaos, CriticsProposeScrapping
Them, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 1997, at Al).
'99
Id. (citing FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE UGLY OF THE NEW
YORK CITY FAMILY COURT 6, 9 (1997)).
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Angeles courts afforded each juvenile only four or five minutes on average."'
Adding the time and resources associated with jury trials to already overburdened
courts might completely derail the juvenile justice system.2"' These statistics
suggest that the courts simply do not have the time to devote to jury trials.
In response to this potential negative effect, proponents of juries in juvenile
proceedings need only make two points. First, not all juveniles facing delinquency
proceedings would be afforded a jury - only those facing serious delinquency
charges. 0 2 Second, the statistics mentioned above suggest that juvenile courts are
in dire need of additional resources from the states, including more judges and more
courtrooms. Any burden thatjuries might bring upon thejuvenile courts could also
be answered with the devotion of additional state resources. A lack of resources
should never be an excuse to deny a class of citizens their constitutional rights.
Opponents of jury trials in delinquency proceedings contend that juries would
impede judges' efforts to ensure the best interests of juveniles appearing in their
courts.2 °3 In Justice Victory's majority opinion in State ex rel. D.J., he voiced a
concern that juries would "destroy the flexibility of the juvenile judge as the trier
of fact, which allows the judge to take into consideration social and psychological
factors, family background, and education in order to shape the disposition in the
best interest of both the child and society. ' 24 On the surface, this seems like a valid
concern, as the juvenile courts were supposed to be a place where the judge was
able to have great flexibility in his or her approach to each juvenile delinquent.2 5
Juries might take this flexibility away, and the vision of the nurturing juvenile court
will be lost.20 6
In the ideal picture painted by those who developed the juvenile courts in the
beginning of the twentieth century, this may have been a valid concern. However,
as will be further discussed below, judges actually have a tendency to be unduly
harsh when they consider alleged juvenile delinquents, turning too quickly to
Id. at 1044-45 (citing EDWARD HUMES, No MATTER How LOUD I SHOUT: A YEAR IN
THE LIFE OF JUVENILE COURT 36, 78-79 (1996)).
20' See Larsen, supra note 152, at 866 (pointing out that the Alabama Supreme Court
refused to allow juries in delinquency proceedings for just that reason).
22 Furthermore, not all juveniles facing serious delinquency proceedings would ask for
200

a jury trial. See BARTOLLAS, supra note 17, at 474 (stating that jury trials are seldom
demanded in the states that grant juveniles the right to ajury trial). This can also be inferred
from the fact that one study indicated that more than one-third of criminal cases that went to
trial were bench trials. See Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 59 (1999). Therefore, it can be assumed that at least some juveniles,
if given the option, would elect for their delinquency proceedings to be heard in front of a
judge rather than a jury.
203 See, e.g., State ex rel. D.J., 2001-2149 (La. 05/14/02), 817 So. 2d 26, 33.
204

Id.

See BARTOLLAS, supra note 17, at 13.
206 See Larsen, supra note 152, at 864.
205
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adjudication.20 7 Furthermore, juries also are susceptible to feeling sympathy for the
accused.20 8 Juveniles would be free to present evidence of their social, educational,
and economic background for the jury's consideration.
Adding to their concern about judges' nurturing roles in the process, opponents
of juries in juvenile proceedings also fear that the process will become less
nurturing overall.2 9 First, juries will cause the process to become more
adversarial.21 ° Second, the private setting will be lost, where the court could assess
and rehabilitate juveniles outside the view of the public.2 ' Opponents might
maintain that a jury's detailed evaluation of an accused juvenile's life will destroy
the notion that juvenile courts are a private and discrete setting where troubled
youngsters can receive a helping hand. Thejurors would have an open window into
the life of an accused juvenile.
In response to these two concerns, proponents ofjury trials might offer multiple
points of consideration. First, an adversarial process is not necessarily detrimental
as it will demonstrate the seriousness of the offense to the juvenile. Furthermore,
it will guarantee juveniles' right to a fair trial, as every fact and proposition will be
contested and the procedures that have been developed to guarantee a defendant's
rights in criminal trials will be used to ensure that a juvenile will receive the just
proceeding that he or she deserves. Second, juveniles' privacy concerns have been
completely trampled by laws, such as the one enacted in Louisiana,212 that have
opened serious delinquency proceedings to the public. With these laws in effect,
what privacy interests are bench trials protecting? Having a jury hear the intimate
details of the juvenile's life is no more intrusive than allowing the press to tell the
juvenile's story to the public.213

See infra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
See FELD, supra note 74, at 154.
209 See Larsen, supra note 152, at 865 (citing Washington Supreme Court and Oregon
Supreme Court decisions that clung to the notion of a nurturing courtroom).
211 See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,545 (1971) ("There is a possibility,
at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the
juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process .. "); see also Larsen, supra note 152,
at 865 (citing to McKeiver and a Kentucky Court of Appeals case).
211 See, e.g., McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550.
207

208

212

LA. REV. CH. CODE ANN.

art. 407 (West 2002).

See Katy Reckdahl, Kids in the Hall, GAMBrr WEEKLY, at http://www.bestofnew
orleans.comlarchives/2001/O522fcovs.html (May 22,2001) (telling the story of Darrell J. and
Alfred A.).
213
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B. Positive Effects of Jurieson the Juvenile Justice System

Proponents of jury trials in delinquency proceedings contend that juries often
2 14
give more credence to defenses and other claims raised by juveniles than judges.
Judges have been shown to be more likely to convict a defendant than juries.2" 5
Scholars suggest that there are several causes of this phenomenon." 6 First, there
are differences in how judges and juries hear evidence. Because juvenile judges
hear hundreds, if not thousands, of cases every year, their senses may become
dulled, and they may consider evidence less meticulously than a jury member that
hears only one case in a span of several years.21 7 Second, juries hold some
sympathy for the defendant and, consequently, may be "easier" on the accused.218
Third, juries have a tendency to adhere more rigidly to the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard of proof. 219 Fourth, judges tend to come from different social,
economic, and educational backgrounds than do jury pools. 220 This difference is
accentuated by voir dire, where potential jurors are excluded for their beliefs and
" ' Judges are not subject to
experiences, and sometimes their level of education.22
222
such a selection process before they hear a case.
Lastly, judges may be more
likely to adjudicate a youth delinquent, despite a lack of proof, if the judge believes
223
that the youth needs the help of the system.
Proponents of jury trials in delinquency proceedings also believe that juries
would be beneficial because they would remove the adjudication decision from the
hands of juvenile court judges, who have been proven to be unreliable finders of
fact. 224 A recent examination ofjudicial fact finding in juvenile justice proceedings
by Martin Guggenheim and Randy Hertz demonstrates that judges often adjudicate
a juvenile delinquent based on insufficient evidence.225 Several examples exist in
214 See, e.g., Brief, supra note 101, at 16-18.
215 See FELD, supra note 74, at 154.
216 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries,and Justice:

Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33
571-82 (1998).

WAKE FOREST L. REv. 553,

217 See FELD, supra note 74, at 155.

Id. at 154.
Id.
220 Id. at 155.
221 id.
222 Id.
223 Id at 154.
224 See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 152, at 860 (arguing that juries would "[a]ssure [a]ccurate
[f]act [finding").
225 See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 216, at 553. The amici discuss Guggenheim and
Hertz in their brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court, highlighting some of the same and some
different factors discussed by Guggenheim and Hertz; see also Brief, supra note 101, at
218
219
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support of this claim.

For instance, in Louisiana, a boy was convicted of

intentionally damaging property after he toppled face first into the wall of a store
following a struggle with a store manager who caught the boy shoplifting.226 In
Texas, a judge adjudicated a youth delinquent for evading a lawful arrest after
holding that a police officer had probable cause to arrest the youth, despite the
officer's inability to point out any evidence of illegal conduct on the part of the
youth.227 In Washington, ajuvenile was adjudged delinquent for aiding and abetting
animal cruelty after the youth merely giggled when a friend threw a pigeon into a
fountain.228
Guggenheim and Hertz also pointed out that judges are often prone to favoring
the facts put forth by the state.229 Reasons for this tendency may be judges'
concerns for being labeled as soft on crime, judges' beliefs that they can protect
society by erring on the side of conviction, or perhaps, judges' desires to ensure that
every youth that needs services receives them.23° Also, judges tend to develop
relationships with the police officers that testify before them, and may be easily
convinced by the officers' testimony.23 ' Additionally, judges' experience on the
bench may cause them to become skeptical of the testimony of the accused.232
Still other factors must be considered. Judges always hear inadmissible
evidence before deeming it inadmissible.233 For some, the evidence may be difficult
to ignore. Indeed, empirical evidence and the accounts of some judges demonstrate
234
that this evidence often received consideration, if only on the subconscious level.
Considering all the factors presented by Guggenheim and Hertz, it becomes
clear that judges can be too quick to adjudge a youth delinquent. Furthermore,
judges are susceptible to bias and sometimes are unable to be the neutral fact finder
that the system asks them to be.235
16-18.
226 Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 216, at 564 (citing In re J.C.G., 97-1044 (La. App.
2 Cir. 02/04/98), 706 So. 2d 1081, 1082).
227 Id. at 565 (citing In re C.R., No. 03-96-00429-CV, 1997 WL 348532, at *2 (Tex. Ct.
App. June 26, 1997)).
228 Id. (citing State v. Simon, No. 38J02-0-I, 1997 WL 292344, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 2, 1997)). These are only three of the sixteen examples provided by Guggenheim and
Hertz that demonstrate judicial fact-finding inadequacies. See id. at 564-66, n.55.
229 See id. at 569.
230 Id. at 569-70.
231 Id. at 574.
232 Id. at 574.
233See id. at 571-74.
234 Id. at 572; see also FELD, supra note 74, at 156 ("Defendants reasonably may question
the impartiality and fairness of their trials whenever judges possess information that would
not be admitted in a jury trial because of concern that it would prejudice the fact-finders.").
235 Also, recall Justice Fortas's comment, "unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." See supra text
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Proponents of jury trials might also point out that the goal of a nurturing
judicial process can be preserved despite the use of juries. Juries would not take
judges' disposition powers away. Every juvenile that would be adjudicated
delinquent would turn to a juvenile court judge for his or her disposition. In fact,
a jury trial would produce a detailed record of the juvenile's offense and
background. The minute facts that ajury trial would produce might even help the
court achieve its goal of nurturing and rehabilitating youth by providing the judge
with a detailed account of the offense and a thorough portrayal of the juvenile's
developmental, social, and economic status.
While there are valid arguments on either side of the debate, it seems apparent
that juries would benefit the juvenile justice system considerably by enhancing
juveniles' access to fair and effective trials. Furthermore, any potential negative
effects, such as unbearable delay or the destruction of judges' flexibility to cater to
each juvenile individually, can be overcome. No one can be certain about the
effects juries might have in delinquency proceedings; however, it seems the
foreseeable benefits to juveniles who face the increasingly punitive consequences
of these proceedings, far outweigh the potentially negative effects associated with
jury trials.
VI. CONCLUSION

The right to demand a jury trial in criminal proceedings is guaranteed by the
Constitution.236 Every person that faces a serious criminal charge enjoys this right.
For some reason, however, the overwhelming majority of states have not extended
this right to delinquency proceedings.237 Originally, this decision was founded on
the nurturing ideals of the modern juvenilejustice system.238 In theory,juries would
only interfere with a juvenile court's ability to provide a young offender with the
guidance and support that he or she needed. 3 9 Yet, somewhere along the way, this
foundation crumbled. As states continue to alter their juvenile justice systems in
order to protect society and to hold youth accountable for their actions, the punitive
aspect of criminal justice invades the juvenile sphere. Louisiana stands as a clear
example of this transition. Now, it seems that the difference between juvenile
justice and criminal justice is only nominal.

accompanying note 44.
236 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
237 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
238 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
239 Id. (explaining, "The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system
would.., provide an attrition of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique
manner.").
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State ex rel. D.J. and similar controversies outside of Louisiana demonstrate
that a strong voice exists that demands the right to a jury trial in delinquency
proceedings. This is an issue of national concern, as it threatens to maintain the
consistent and systematic denial of juveniles' due process rights. The juvenile
justice system of each state must be closely examined in order to determine if a
meaningful distinction between juvenile justice and criminal justice still exists.
When the Louisiana Supreme Court decided State ex rel. D.J., it did so by
relying on outdated premises, arguments, and beliefs. Because of this decision,
Louisiana continues to deny juveniles their due process rights. If other states
continue to ignore this issue of constitutional concern, they will do no better.
Juveniles should be guaranteed the right to a jury trial when they face allegations
of serious delinquency, as the nation's juvenile justice has become nothing short of
criminal. Recall the language of the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury...."24 0 The label "delinquency proceeding" does not change the
reality that juveniles such as Darrell J. and Alfred A. are facing criminal
prosecutions. Accordingly, every time a state refuses to allow ajury to perform the
fact-finding function in a serious delinquency proceeding, it concurrently denies the
alleged juvenile delinquent his or her constitutionally guaranteed right.
Kerrin C. Wolf
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U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

